State v. Leonard

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JAYSEN LEMAR LEONARD, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 23-0247

FILED 10-01-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2022-110828-001
The Honorable Lisa Ann VandenBerg, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Karen Moody
Counsel for Appellee

Law Office of Stephen M. Johnson Inc, Phoenix
By Stephen M. Johnson
Counsel for Appellant
 STATE v. LEONARD
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

KILEY, Judge:

¶1 Jaysen Leonard appeals his conviction and resulting sentence
for misconduct involving weapons. Because he does not establish error, we
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Viewed in the requisite light most favorable to sustaining the
jury’s verdicts, State v. Thompson, 252 Ariz. 279, 287, ¶ 2 n. 3 (2022), the
evidence shows that one evening in March 2022, a Phoenix police officer
was in the vicinity of 26th Avenue and Bethany Home Road when he was
approached by someone from a nearby bar with a request for assistance.
The officer entered the bar and saw a man, later identified as Leonard, lying
on the floor being restrained by security guards. Upon seeing the officer, a
security guard yelled that Leonard “ha[d] a gun in his pocket.” The officer
removed the gun from Leonard’s pocket. After being advised of his Miranda
rights,1 Leonard admitted that he is a convicted felon and acknowledged
that he is not permitted to possess a firearm.

¶3 The State charged Leonard with misconduct involving
weapons, a class four felony, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3102(A)(4)
(prohibited possessor).

¶4 At trial, the State presented, inter alia, the testimony of the
responding officer and documentary evidence of Leonard’s felony
conviction. Leonard then testified, stating that he arrived at the bar that
evening unarmed when he was approached by two men he did not know.
One of the men “shoulder check[ed]” him in an “aggressive” manner and
then the other, who stood facing him “almost nose to nose,” accused him of
taking “his girl’s money.” Although Leonard denied the accusation, the
man demanded that Leonard turn over his watch to make up for the

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).

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Decision of the Court

purported theft. At that point, Leonard testified, he began to fear he was
“being strong armed.”

¶5 Leonard testified that “one of [his] friends” at the bar,
observing the “slightly heated conversation,” approached Leonard and
“kind of nudged” him. Leonard looked down and saw that the friend was
offering him a gun. Fearing that the two men would “assault” him, Leonard
stated, he “grabbed” the gun and put it in his pocket. He insisted, however,
that it “wasn’t [his] intent to harm or hurt anyone or even have possession
of the gun.”

¶6 According to Leonard, one of the two men then sucker-
punched him, and the other grabbed him from behind and “choked” him
until he “passed out.” When he came to, he stated, he was “on the ground”
and the assailants were gone.

¶7 When the State sought to confirm, during its cross-
examination of Leonard, that he took the gun before he was punched,
Leonard said, “It all happened so fast I don’t know if I’m putting it in the
right order, but it was definitely—an assault happened and I grabbed his
gun.”

¶8 Leonard admitted that neither of his assailants threatened
him with a weapon. He also admitted that he never told the arresting officer
that the gun did not belong to him, that it was given to him by a friend after
he arrived at the bar, that he feared for his life, or that he was choked until
he passed out. The bar had no surveillance cameras, but the responding
officer’s body-worn camera showed that Leonard was conscious when the
officer entered the bar.

¶9 The superior court instructed the jury on necessity as a
justification for the charged conduct, see A.R.S. § 13-417, but denied
Leonard’s request for an instruction on duress, see A.R.S. § 13-412. The court
reasoned that Leonard “ha[d] not argued a theory of the case that would
make duress applicable,” the necessity instruction was “adequate . . . based
on the defense’s theory,” and a “duress instruction would potentially cause
the jury to be confused or misled with regards to the state of law.”

¶10 Jurors found Leonard guilty, and the superior court
sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. Leonard timely appealed. We
have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-
4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

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 STATE v. LEONARD
Decision of the Court

¶11 Leonard argues he was entitled to a duress instruction and
that the superior court violated his federal constitutional right to due
process by depriving him of the opportunity to assert a duress defense. We
review the superior court’s refusal to give a requested instruction for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Richter, 245 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 11 (2018). But we review
evidentiary rulings involving constitutional questions de novo. State v.
Armstrong, 218 Ariz. 451, 458, ¶ 20 (2008). Because Leonard did not raise a
due process objection at trial, we review that claim for fundamental error
only. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140, ¶ 12 (2018).

¶12 “[A] defendant is entitled to a justification instruction if it is
supported by the slightest evidence.” State v. Ruggiero, 211 Ariz. 262, 264, ¶
10 (App. 2005) (cleaned up). A justification instruction “need not be given,”
however, “unless it is reasonably and clearly supported by the evidence.”
State v. Vassell, 238 Ariz. 281, 284, ¶ 9 (App. 2015) (cleaned up). In evaluating
whether a justification instruction should have been given, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. State v. King, 225 Ariz.
87, 90, ¶ 13 (2010).

¶13 Duress and necessity are both justification defenses set forth
in A.R.S. Title 13, Chapter 4. The duress defense is codified in A.R.S. § 13-
412(A), which provides that

[c]onduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is
justified if a reasonable person would believe that he was
compelled to engage in the proscribed conduct by the threat
or use of immediate physical force against his person or the
person of another which resulted or could result in serious
physical injury which a reasonable person in the situation
would not have resisted.

¶14 The use or threat of force necessary to support a duress
defense “must be present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature
as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
injury if the [criminal] act is not done.” State v. Jones, 119 Ariz. 555, 558 (App.
1978). Significantly, however, the defense of duress is distinct from self-
defense. State v. Lamar, 144 Ariz. 490, 497 (App. 1984) (“The defense of
duress is not available as a substitute for self-defense.”). The defense of
duress “envisions a third person compelling a person by the threat of
immediate physical violence to commit a crime against another person or the
property of another person.” Id. (emphasis added). The duress defense applies,
in other words, “only when third parties are the victims.” Richter, 245 Ariz.
at 8, ¶ 31.

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 STATE v. LEONARD
Decision of the Court

¶15 Leonard testified that he accepted the gun proffered by a
friend and put it in his pocket because he was in fear for his own safety. He
never claimed, however, that he felt coerced by the two aggressors “to
commit a crime against another person or the property of another person.”
Lamar, 144 Ariz. at 497. No evidence was presented, nor did the State allege,
that Leonard ever caused or threatened harm to a third party. Leonard’s
testimony thus could not possibly support a duress defense, and the trial
court properly declined to instruct the jury on duress. See State v. Speers, 209
Ariz. 125, 132, ¶ 27 (App. 2004) (“A trial court commits reversible error
when it instructs on an issue or theory that is not supported by evidence
because it invites the jury to speculate as to possible non-existent
circumstances.”) (cleaned up).

¶16 In any event, even if the facts of this case could be said to
support a duress instruction, the superior court’s refusal to instruct the
jurors on duress entitles Leonard to no relief because the necessity
instruction adequately covered the issue of whether Leonard was justified
in taking possession of the gun when confronted by two aggressors. State v.
Almeida, 238 Ariz. 77, 81, ¶ 17 (App. 2015) (“A trial court is not required to
give a requested jury instruction if its other instructions adequately cover
the issue.”).

¶17 The court gave the jurors the following instruction on the
defense of necessity:

Now, the defendant was justified in engaging in conduct that
constituted the offense of misconduct involving weapons if

1, a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would be
compelled to engage in the conduct;

And 2, the defendant had no reasonable alternative to avoid
imminent public or private injury greater than the injury the
defendant reasonably believed might have resulted from the
conduct constituting the offense;

And, the defendant, 3, did not intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly place himself in a situation in which it was probable
that the defendant would have to engage in the conduct
constituting the offense.

You must measure the defendant’s belief against what a
reasonable person in the situation would have believed. The
State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt

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 STATE v. LEONARD
Decision of the Court

that the defendant did not act with such justification. If the
State fails to carry this burden, then you must find the
defendant not guilty of the charge.

¶18 The standard instruction on the defense of duress provides in
part that “[a] defendant is justified” in engaging in conduct giving rise to
criminal charges “if a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances
would have believed” that he or she “was compelled to commit such
conduct” by another’s use or threat of force that could result “in serious
physical injury that a reasonable person in the situation would not have
resisted.” RAJI Stat. Crim. 4.12 (duress) (4th ed. 2016); see also A.R.S. § 13-
412(A).

¶19 “Common law historically distinguished between the
defenses of duress and necessity”—characterizing duress as coercion by
“an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury” from
another person while describing necessity as a choice between “two evils”
compelled by a non-human force. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409–
10 (1980). More recently, however, “cases have tended to blur the
distinction” between the defenses. Id. at 410. Under the circumstances here,
Leonard’s claim that he acted under duress was encompassed by the
necessity instruction. Under either defense, Leonard had just two options:
to take the gun or not to take the gun. To find Leonard’s conduct justified
by necessity, jurors would need to find that a “reasonable person” in his
situation “would be compelled” to take the gun without any “reasonable
alternative” to doing so. A.R.S. § 13-417(A). To find Leonard’s conduct
justified by duress, jurors would need to make essentially the same finding:
that a “reasonable person” in his situation would have been “compelled”
to take the gun and could “not have resisted” doing so. A.R.S. § 13-412(A).
Under the circumstances presented in this case, the necessity instruction
adequately covered Leonard’s claim that he acted as he did under duress.
Cf. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 410 (“Under any definition of these defenses [of duress
and necessity] one principle remains constant: if there was a reasonable,
legal alternative to violating the law . . . the defenses will fail.”).

¶20 Leonard submits that a duress instruction was warranted
because “the assailants’ application of force against him, coupled with the
inherent danger of the situation, rendered him incapable of resisting the
pressure exerted upon him.” But Leonard could make that same argument
in support of a necessity defense because being “incapable of resisting the
pressure” to take the gun is just another way of saying one is “compelled to
do so.” Indeed, that is precisely what Leonard’s counsel told the jurors in
closing argument. Referring to Leonard’s testimony about his confrontation

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 STATE v. LEONARD
Decision of the Court

with the alleged assailants, defense counsel asked the jurors whether they
would feel “compelled” to take possession of a weapon if someone “started
choking your neck and punching you in the face?” before answering his
own question: “Which one wouldn’t? You all would.” Because the necessity
instruction encompassed Leonard’s position that a reasonable person in his
position would have felt compelled to take possession of the gun, the
court’s unwillingness to give a duress instruction as well entitles him to no
relief. Almeida, 238 Ariz. at 81, ¶ 17.

¶21 Leonard also argues that the superior court’s refusal to give a
duress instruction deprived him of due process. See State v. Lehr, 227 Ariz.
140, 150, ¶ 39 (2011) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that ‘criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.’”) (quoting California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). Our analysis of Leonard’s claim of
instructional error dooms his constitutional claim. Because the necessity
instruction encompassed his claim of duress, Leonard was not deprived of
an opportunity to present a complete defense at trial. See State v. Reaves, 252
Ariz. 553, 565, ¶¶ 31–33 (App. 2022) (holding that the superior court’s
refusal to give a requested instruction did not deprive the defendant of a
complete defense when the instruction given adequately addressed the law
relevant to the defendant’s proposed defense). Leonard’s due process claim
thus fails.

CONCLUSION

¶22 We affirm Leonard’s conviction and sentence.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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